2000 - The Second Intifada

AMMAN: The Second Palestinian Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, began in late September 2000, following the collapse of the Camp David Summit and a controversial visit by Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Haram Al-Sharif, the site of Al-Aqsa Mosque. 

Unlike the largely nonviolent First Intifada, this uprising marked a significant turn toward militarization, resulting in mistakes and challenges that have profoundly shaped the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ever since. 

During the First Intifada, Palestinians employed peaceful grassroots strategies that garnered global sympathy and put pressure on Israel diplomatically. 

In contrast, the militarized tactics of the Second Intifada — including suicide bombings and attacks on Israeli civilians — alienated many international supporters and reinforced negative stereotypes of Palestinians as the perpetrators of violence. 

This shift undermined the moral high ground previously held by Palestinians and allowed Israel to frame its own actions as acts of self-defense against terrorism, rather than as an occupying force suppressing a people’s right to self-determination. 

Internal divisions within the Palestinian leadership compounded the challenges. The Palestinian Authority, under Yasser Arafat, struggled to maintain control as militant factions, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, gained influence. These groups operated independently, often clashing with the PA’s objectives and undermining its authority. 

The lack of a unified strategy not only weakened the Palestinian cause but also emboldened Israel to exploit the divisions. The inability of the PA to present a cohesive front further eroded its legitimacy among Palestinians, many of whom felt betrayed by what they perceived as corruption and ineffectiveness within their own leadership. The popular support for armed attacks meant that even young activists from the more moderate centrist ruling party, Fatah, were motivated to carry out some assaults against Israeli soldiers. 

Arafat’s ambiguous stance on armed resistance — neither fully endorsing nor condemning it — led to confusion and a lack of direction. This ambiguity allowed Israel to accuse the PA of complicity in the violence, and justify military operations that devastated Palestinian infrastructure and deepened the occupation. 

The destruction of key public institutions, including schools, hospitals and police stations, left Palestinian society in disarray, with long-term repercussions still felt today. 

It is estimated the violence resulted in the deaths of more than 6,000 Palestinian and more than 1,000 Israeli combatants and civilians. According to the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, of the 6,371 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces in the 10 years from 2000 to 2010, at least 2,996, including 1,317 minors, were noncombatants. Of the 1,083 Israelis killed, 741 were civilians. 

From an economic perspective, the Second Intifada was a catastrophe. The Israeli military response included widespread closures and curfews, and the destruction of infrastructure, crippling the Palestinian economy. Unemployment and poverty rates soared, creating a humanitarian crisis that further fueled resentment and despair. 

The economic devastation not only hurt Palestinian livelihoods but weakened the ability of the PA to govern effectively, as it became increasingly reliant on foreign aid to sustain basic services. 

While the First Intifada successfully leveraged media coverage to highlight the plight of Palestinians under occupation, the focus of the Second Intifada on violent resistance shifted the narrative. Western media often portrayed Palestinians as aggressors, overshadowing legitimate grievances about occupation, settlement expansions and human rights abuses. This hindered efforts to gain support for international pressure on Israel to change its policies. 

The Second Intifada also highlighted a generational divide within Palestinian society. Younger Palestinians, disillusioned by the Oslo Accords and the lack of tangible progress, were more inclined toward armed resistance. 

Meanwhile, illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank proliferated during this period, a clear and highly visible sign that Israeli authorities had no intention of ever ending the occupation of Palestine. 

In contrast, older generations who had witnessed the success of nonviolent strategies during the First Intifada were skeptical of a more militarized approach. This generational rift weakened the cohesion of the Palestinian struggle, making it more difficult to mobilize unified action. 

The Second Intifada provided Israel with an opportunity to tighten its grip on the occupied territories. Under the guise of combating terrorism, Israeli authorities expanded settlements, constructed the 712-kilometer-long separation wall, and implemented policies that further fragmented Palestinian communities. 

The wall, in particular, has had a lasting impact, serving to effectively annex large swaths of Palestinian land and render the prospect of a contiguous Palestinian state increasingly untenable. Coupled with checkpoints, the wall, which remains the single largest obstacle in the West Bank, restricts the movement of Palestinians, entrenches territorial and social fragmentation, undermines livelihoods, and hinders access to basic emergency, health and educational services. 

These measures, justified as security necessities, served to entrench the occupation and made the goal of a two-state solution more elusive than ever. 

Such activities and restrictions have intensified since the Oct. 7 cross-border attacks by Hamas; Israeli authorities added 86 new obstacles to movement that affect the lives of 3.3 million Palestinians across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, according to 2024 data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

There are now 793 obstacles to movement in the West Bank, including 89 round-the-clock checkpoints and 149 that operate part time, during the day. In addition, 150 communities own farmland from which they have been isolated by the wall. Previously they could access this land through 69 agricultural gates controlled by Israeli forces, but they have been barred from working the land since October 2023, resulting in significant losses of income, particularly from olive groves and other seasonal crops. 

The Second Intifada also created a precedent for settler violence. Emboldened by the Israeli government’s harsh crackdown on Palestinians, settlers in the West Bank carried out attacks on Palestinian farmers, homes and villages, often with impunity. 

The attacks continue to escalate. In 2024, UNOCHA recorded 1,420 attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinians and their properties in the West Bank, the highest number since it began tracking the figures in 2006. During 2023 and 2024 alone, Israeli forces and settlers killed 1,003 Palestinians in the West Bank, according to UNOCHA. Settler violence is now a persistent feature of the conflict, further exacerbating tensions and deepening Palestinian mistrust of both the Israeli government and the international community. 

The Second Intifada stands as a cautionary tale of the perils of militarization, internal divisions and the failure to adapt strategies to shifting realities. While the uprising underscored the depth of Palestinian frustration and the injustices of the occupation, its methods ultimately weakened the Palestinian cause and allowed Israel to solidify its control over the occupied territories. 

Moving forward, Palestinians must reflect on the lessons of the Second Intifada, as well as the Oct. 7 attacks, to chart a more effective course. A renewed emphasis on nonviolent resistance, coupled with efforts to unify the Palestinian leadership and regain international support, could provide a path toward achieving their aspirations. 

At the same time, the international community must recognize its role in perpetuating the status quo and take meaningful steps to address the root causes of the conflict. Without accountability and a genuine commitment to justice, the mistakes and challenges of the Second Intifada are doomed to be repeated, perpetuating a cycle of violence and suffering that benefits no one. 

The Palestinian armed resistance is the product not only of the continuing Israeli occupation, but also the inaction of the international community and the absence of any political horizon. Without any hope for a better future, Palestinians mistakenly resorted to armed attacks, which delayed rather than accelerated the end of occupation. 

The price of the armed struggle, whether the Second Intifada or the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas, has been high, not only in terms of lives lost and the destruction of Palestinian livelihoods and property, but because it also relieved the international community of its obligation to work on efforts to end the Israeli occupation and allow Palestinians to exercise their inalienable political rights. 

• Daoud Kuttab is a columnist for Arab News, specializing in Middle Eastern, and more specifically, Palestinian affairs. He is the author of the book “State of Palestine NOW: Practical and logical arguments for the best way to bring peace to the Middle East.”