2009 - The Obama Doctrine: Good intentions gone bad

RIYADH: In 2009, the first year of Barack Obama’s presidency, a distinctive approach to US foreign policy began to emerge, now often referred to as the “Obama Doctrine.” 

It was characterized by a pragmatic, multilateral and diplomacy-first strategy that aimed to restore Washington’s standing in the world after years of unilateral, aggressive interventions, spearheaded by his predecessor George W. Bush. 

At its core, the doctrine sought to redefine US leadership in a multipolar world. It was not apparent in any single document or speech, it was fashioned through a series of policy decisions, speeches and actions after Obama took office. 

One of the earliest signs of the doctrine can be found in the president’s inaugural address in January 2009, when he pledged to “seek a new way forward” with the Muslim world “based on mutual interest and mutual respect,” and to “extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” 

This rhetoric of engagement marked a departure from the more confrontational policies of the previous administration, particularly in the Middle East. 

Obama’s speech in Egypt in June 2009 further solidified this approach. Addressing an audience at Cairo University, he underscored his administration’s commitment to soft power and diplomacy as tools to address global issues, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation and regional conflicts. 

Departing from the discourse on democratization that had become too closely associated with the “war on terror” and the neoconservative ideology that had formed the theoretical framework for the 2003 military intervention in Iraq, Obama instead focused on rebuilding relations with Egypt, as well as “reaching out” to Syria and Iran. 

In an article published by Foreign Affairs magazine in 2007, Obama wrote of the need to “reinvigorate American diplomacy.”  

He warned that the US policy of “issuing threats and relying on intermediaries to curb Iran’s nuclear program, sponsorship of terrorism and regional aggression is failing. Although we must not rule out using military force, we should not hesitate to talk directly to Iran.” 

His administration’s approach, rooted in engagement with long-standing adversaries, translated into the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, and was also evident in dealings with Cuba. After Obama’s inauguration, diplomatic efforts began in an attempt to thaw relations with Havana, culminating in the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in 2015. 

While he was not averse to using military power, his administration sought to limit large-scale interventions, focusing instead on targeted operations and partnerships. The drawdown of US forces in Iraq, announced in February 2009, signaled this shift toward the winding down of protracted wars. 

His foreign policy, in response to criticisms of America’s previous “go-it-alone” strategy, focused on strengthening ties with NATO and Russia, building alliances with Asia, reengaging with the UN, and participating in international forums such as the G20 to tackle issues ranging from economic recovery after the 2008 financial crisis, to climate change. For instance, under Obama the US took a leading role in the 2016 Paris Agreement. 

Despite these successes, however, his doctrine would soon prove less effective in the Middle East, where his policies, or absence thereof, drew criticism for undermining Washington’s credibility, emboldening adversaries and shaking the confidence of allies. 

His military intervention in Libya, which was authorized by the UN Security Council with the aim of protecting protesters from the crackdown by Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi on unrest in 2011, left the country in chaos and under threat from violent extremists. 

In a 2016 Fox News interview, Obama admitted that the operation in Libya was the “biggest mistake” of his presidency, for its failure to plan for the aftermath of ًQaddafi’s ouster. His stance would later be reflected by his inconsistent approach to the Middle East, in particular when Syria descended in civil war in 2012.

Obama’s reluctance to intervene in Syria led to accusations of complicity in the violence of the regime of President Bashar Assad, which killed at least 400,000 people, devastated civilian neighborhoods, and triggered one of the worst immigration crises in Europe since the Second World War. 

His hesitant approach was most evident when, in August 2012 he pledged military intervention if Assad used chemical weapons in Syria, describing this as a “red line.” A year later, on Aug. 21, 2013, Obama’s “red line” was crossed when images of victims emerged as evidence that Assad had used sarin and chlorine gas against towns near Damascus. 

In a September 2013 speech, Obama, haunted by a decade of failed wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, backed down from launching air strikes against the Assad regime in favor of diplomacy, saying: “I’ve spent four-and-a-half years working to end wars, not to start them.” 

Instead, he settled for a deal with Russia, later enshrined in UN Resolution 2118, which required Syria to dismantle its stockpiles of chemical weapons and provided for some covert military aid for the moderate opposition, to help diffuse the power of Islamist fighters. 

Soon, however, that proved not to be enough. Washington’s absence from Syria solidified Assad’s grip on cities, empowered Iran and Russia in the region, and created a vacuum that allowed Daesh to emerge. 

In August 2014, a US president who had once rejected the notion of a “global war on terror” found himself entangled in one. He authorized air strikes on Daesh targets in Iraq and, later, Syria, as he organized an international coalition to combat the terror group. 

In less than two years, he shifted from ordering airstrikes to deploying more than 475 additional military advisors in Iraq, and more than 4,000 ground troops, including special operations forces, in both Iraq and Syria. 

The rise of Daesh complicated Obama’s plans for winding down the US military presence in Iraq. At the same time, it forced him to authorize limited airstrikes in Libya. 

The influx of refugees and spill over of repercussions from the civil war in Syria destabilized the country’s neighbors, including US security partners such as Jordan and Turkey, and undermined trust in Obama’s administration, the cautious approach of which was seen as a missed opportunity to shape the outcome of the war in Syria. 

Some viewed the Obama doctrine as appeasing Iran, with the lifting of multilayered sanctions allowing the Islamic Republic to freely trade and receive foreign investment, leading to the regime in Tehran strengthening its proxy networks across the region and its corridor, via Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon. 

In addition, his reliance on drone strikes as a counterterrorism tool, particularly in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, which was portrayed as a more favorable alternative to large-scale military interventions, attracted significant criticism for the ethical and legal implications, as well as the effects on civilian populations.  

Overall, the legacy of the doctrine continues to be debated. Some hail it as a necessary recalibration of US foreign policy after the war in Iraq, while others consider it a retreat from leadership, or an overly cautious approach to global challenges. 

At a time when the Middle East was undergoing radical transformations, Washington appeared to favor hesitation over initiative, raising questions about the effectiveness of this strategy in achieving regional stability. 

• Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is head of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah).