Egypt’s three options in the Sudan civil war

Sudan’s civil war reached a turning point in March when the Sudanese regular army regained control of the presidential palace in the heart of Khartoum after months of fierce battles with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. It was not only a milestone in Sudan but also a pivotal moment for Egypt, the Sudanese army’s closest historical ally and a major regional stakeholder in Sudanese affairs.

Since the conflict broke out in April 2023, the paramilitaries had maintained a significant military presence across the capital, having leveraged their previous role as a security partner in state institutions. They seized control of key sites including the palace, state media headquarters, and strategic areas such as Al-Muqran, Al-Riyadh, and Khartoum airport. They positioned snipers in high-rise buildings including Al-Fateh Tower and the Friendship Hall.

However, by September 2024 the Sudanese army had launched a coordinated ground offensive on three fronts — East Nile, Jabal Awliya, and Al-Baqir — and reclaimed important cities such as Jebel Moya, Sennar, and Wad Madani. This enabled the army to encircle Khartoum from the south and east while advancing slowly from Omdurman in the west.

In the climactic battle for the palace on March 21, the Rapid Support Forces suffered significant losses, an estimated 600 fighters and over 100 military vehicles destroyed. As their defenses collapsed, the group withdrew from their command centers in Al-Riyadh, the Sports City, and Africa University, effectively ending their presence in the capital.

Since the outbreak of war, Egypt has supported the Sudanese army, guided by strategic concerns about southern stability, Nile water security, and the threat posed by irregular armed groups near its southern border. However, Egypt’s support remained unofficial and behind the scenes, until Hemedti began accusing Cairo of direct involvement.

Last October he publicly accused the Egyptian military of air attacks on paramilitary positions in Jebel Moya, and of supplying drones and US-made bombs to the army. He claimed his forces were “betrayed and killed by Egyptian airstrikes.”

Later, the Rapid Support Forces escalated its rhetoric, threatening to expose “Egyptian prisoners of war,” labelling them “mercenaries,” and warning of retaliation. One of Hemedti’s advisers even suggested targeting Egypt’s High Dam, an ominous threat interpreted by many as a message crafted by hostile regional actors, particularly Ethiopia.

Despite official denials from Egypt’s Foreign Ministry and armed forces, numerous diplomatic and Western media sources indicated that Egypt had indeed provided limited military support to the Sudanese army, especially during critical phases of the conflict, although not to the extent of full-scale intervention.

In March 2025, the Rapid Support Forces took the unprecedented step of imposing a ban on all Sudanese exports to Egypt from paramilitary-controlled areas. The banned goods included peanuts, gum Arabic, livestock, gold and minerals, oils, grains, tobacco, sorghum, and hibiscus: The RSF warned traders under its jurisdiction that even exporting eben “a single cup of gum Arabic” to Egypt would be considered treason and any vehicle heading north to the Egyptian border would be declared “an enemy,” the paramilitaries warned traders.

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, Egypt has supported the Sudanese army. It now has three options.

Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy

This ban was not merely economic, it was a political message. The Rapid Support Forces now view Egypt as not just a supporter of the army but as a direct adversary. Although the main trade routes to Egypt remain under paramilitary control, the army’s hold over the agricultural heartlands of Darfur and Kordofan gives it leverage over key exports traditionally destined for the Egyptian market.

However, this raises crucial economic questions: does Hemedti have alternative markets for these goods? Who will buy them amid territorial isolation and diplomatic constraints? Do the Rapid Support Forces have the logistical capacity to run a regional wartime economy?

Cairo now faces an extremely complex scenario. On the battlefield, the army is gaining ground, with Egyptian backing, but the war continues to drain all sides. The paramilitaries still maintain a strong presence in western Sudan, making a total military victory far from imminent.

Politically, Hemedti has formed a parallel “government of peace and unity” in partnership with the National Umma Party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and various civil and tribal forces. Headquartered in Nairobi, the new government has a secular federal constitution that separates religion from the state. This creates a parallel claim to legitimacy that may appeal to some regional and international powers as an alternative to the army-led administration in Port Sudan, strongly backed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Regionally, even indirect involvement by the UAE or Ethiopia gives the paramilitaries maneuvering room, while Egypt treads a fine line, neither fully intervening nor maintaining a purely neutral stance.

Egypt must now choose between three main strategies. First, support a full military victory for the army. This option is appealing in securing a strategic ally in control of Sudan, but it risks dragging Egypt into a broader regional conflict if the war spreads toward Darfur, Libya, or Ethiopia.

Second, push for a re-engineered political settlement. Leveraging the army’s recent victories, Egypt could advocate a settlement that sidelines the Rapid Support Forces militarily but allows for limited political representation of their allies, preventing total marginalization and international backlash.

Third, adopt a phased withdrawal. Egypt could scale back its involvement to intelligence and humanitarian assistance, opting to wait out the conflict. But this carries the risk of losing influence to other regional players and forfeiting its leadership role.

The Sudanese army’s triumph in Khartoum was not achieved without Egyptian support. However, it has also triggered an open confrontation with the Rapid Support Forces, who now explicitly view Cairo as an enemy. With frontlines shifting, internal Sudanese divisions deepening, and regional interference mounting, Egypt finds itself at a crossroads.

It must now decide: will it manage the Sudanese conflict as a temporary border crisis, or as a long-term struggle over Sudan’s identity, sovereignty, and its role in Egypt’s national security doctrine? The answer may shape the future of both countries for years to come.

• Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. X: @ALMenawy