Iran: Pragmatism after the ‘flood’

Iranian commentators appear to be relaxed about the prospects of the ongoing negotiations with the US. Some have implied that a honeymoon period is possible with the “Great Satan” if its intentions are sincere. They speak of a mutual need. Iran needs an agreement that would end the cycles of sanctions and accusations, while the American administration needs an achievement of the size of an Iran nuclear deal. They say that Washington has something to offer Tehran and vice versa. They say that the world today is going through a period of reconciliation, not one of heated rhetoric that stokes tensions.

Some observers have even said that Donald Trump’s administration may offer an opportunity for Iran because it wants to enter Iranian markets and exploit investment opportunities there. Asked about their views, Iranian citizens say that now is not the time for costly confrontations, but for cooperation and respect of interests. The participants in the American-Iranian dialogue do not hesitate to say that the talks are beneficial and constructive and that they have taken preliminary steps that can be built upon.

The talks between Washington and Tehran should have taken place amid tensions and should have been teetering on the edge of the abyss. After all, the master of the White House is Trump. He is the man who tore up the previous nuclear agreement that Iran had won under Barack Obama’s presidency. He is the same man who ordered the killing of Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport. He is also the same man who, just weeks ago, told Iran to choose between a new deal and a possible US-backed Israeli strike. Iran does not normally succumb to such rhetoric, but it did this time.

The observer has the right to wonder why Iran suddenly adopted a realistic approach. Is it seeking a truce because Trump really does follow through with his threats? Does it sense that the man who took a decision as significant as the killing of Soleimani would not think twice about giving Benjamin Netanyahu the green light to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities, with inevitable American help to complete the mission?

Iranian citizens say that now is not the time for costly confrontations, but for cooperation and respect of interests

Ghassan Charbel

Has Tehran derived the lessons it should have from the series of wars that erupted after the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation? It could not save Hamas. It could not save Hezbollah. The scenes of Houthi positions coming under American fire speak for themselves. Has Tehran realized the extent of the loss that was Syria being taken out of the so-called Axis of Resistance after Bashar Assad was ousted from power? We also must not forget about Iraq, which wants to steer clear of any possible conflict.

Tehran evidently took a decision several years ago to avoid becoming embroiled in any direct confrontation with the US. I heard this myself from Iranian officials. I asked the people I met in Tehran a simple question about whether they believed a war would erupt with the US given the constant tensions between them. The answers may have been phrased differently, but they were all effectively the same: “You are asking about a war that will never happen.” Some did not hesitate to say that Iran is skilled at living on the brink of war without ever being dragged into one.

I asked them to elaborate on this conviction and they told me to ignore the heated rhetoric. Iran knows that the American military is a mighty force that is capable of destroying any target in the world. It has no interest in colliding with a force that could take the country back several decades, they told me. They added that American jets could inflict massive damage on their factories, air force and everything the country has achieved since the 1979 revolution.

With these explanations came assertions: We will never surrender to American might. We hold the cards that can exert pressure and we know how to use them. Moreover, America knows how important Iran is and that it is impossible to replicate the Iraqi experience — toppling the regime through a ground invasion.

Tehran evidently took a decision several years ago to avoid becoming embroiled in any direct confrontation with the US

Ghassan Charbel

This does not mean that we approve of the American policy in the region, whether in Palestine or beyond. We are in a confrontation with the US, but this confrontation is taking place in the region, not inside Iran. The region will not remain an open field where America can hunt down whoever it wants against the will of the people of the region. We have allies in several places and can bank on proxies and wars of attrition by proxy.

The decision to avert a direct military confrontation with the US was present during the most difficult circumstances the region has endured. It was there when Iran was leading a major coup against the American presence in the Middle East. The suicide operations that took place in Beirut were aimed at undermining the American and Western presence in Lebanon. Soleimani himself was in charge of depleting the American military presence in Iraq and facilitating the infiltration of extremists into the country. The Iranian coup was an obvious success when Syria became a solid member of the Axis of Resistance. Soleimani paved a road from Tehran to Beirut passing through Iraq and Syria.

But this is now in the past. Beirut and Damascus have changed. The Houthis are taking shelter in tunnels in a war without end. The axis was broken by Israeli barbarism, American support and technological superiority.

Has Iran acknowledged that the era of coups that changed the balance of power in the region, as well as in four of its maps, is over? There is no doubt that the Iran that is involved in the current negotiations with the US is taking part with fewer cards. Hamas itself has proposed a five-year truce and abandoned its desire to keep running Gaza. Hezbollah has limited options. It cannot go back to war now that Syria is under President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s rule. It is also widely known that the majority of the Lebanese people oppose a return to war and support limiting the possession of weapons in their country to the state.

• Ghassan Charbel is editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. X: @GhasanCharbel

This article first appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat.